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The Challenge of 
Understanding Radical Constructivism
 
To say “it is” is to grasp for permanence.
To say “it is not” is to adopt the view of nihilism.
Therefore a wise person
Does not say “exists” or “does not exist.”
– Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika, 
2nd century C.E. (Garfield 1995, Chapter 15:10)
 
o honestly agree or disagree with some-
one’s position, one must first under-
stand that person’s position. Only then can
one really decide about the other person’s
position.
Many people have expressed disagreement
with von Glasersfeld’s notion of radical con-
structivism.
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 The list of references to the
expressions of disagreement in print is very
large. In addition there are probably gigabytes
of such expressions on-line. Much of the
debate has been on a philosophical level,
removed at least somewhat from applica-
tion.
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 But some have gone so far as to claim
that radical constructivism is dangerous
when applied to education.
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Most, if not all, of these lines of disagree-
ment with radical constructivism have one
aspect in common. They are expositions of
how radical constructivism contains contra-
dictions with the basic premises of realism.
Unfortunately, this common thread is not
acknowledged.
 
A fundamental 
difference
 
The basic position of radical constructivism is
fundamentally incommensurate with that of
realism. Von Glasersfeld (1999a, [13]) puts
forth the essential difference:
“What differentiates radical constructivism
from the tradition, is the proposal unequiv-
ocally to give up the notion that knowledge
ought to be a veridical ‘representation’ of a
world as it ‘exists’ prior to being experi-
enced (that is, ontological reality).”
Coming from a different experience, his-
tory and philosophy of physics, Max Jammer
(1957, p. 2) seems to be referring to the same
thing when in the middle of the last century
he wrote:
“As a result of modern research in physics,
the ambition and hope, still cherished by
most authorities of the last century, that
physical science could offer a photo-
graphic picture and true image of reality
had to be abandoned.”
Still, the realist position is alive and well in
physics, as evidenced by this comment from
de la Torre and Zamorano (2001, p. 103):
“…we postulate the objective existence of
physical reality that can be known to our
minds… with an ever growing precision by
the subtle play of theory and experiment.”
It appears that a consequence of the realist
position is: everything is ultimately about the
truth, which can be known. Furthermore, in
realism, when comparing two statements
about the world it must be possible to deter-
mine which is closer to the truth. On the other
hand, in radical constructivism, truth is not
the point because such truth is not accessible.
In radical constructivism our ways of know-
ing do not access such truth. Hence, the two
positions could hardly be more different.
 
The problem with the 
debates about radical 
constructivism
 
The issue of initial assumptions
 
Every position, paradigm or ideology that
describes the nature of human knowing is
based on its own particular set of initial
assumptions. Initial assumptions are at best
taken on belief and fit with experience.
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 It
appears the initial assumptions of a culture
are uncritically adopted as an implicit part of
one’s milieu by those less careful or thought-
ful. Initial assumptions cannot be known to
be true. They cannot be proved.
If one discovers an initial assumption does
not fit experience, then the logical structure
built on this assumption is at least suspect, if
not demolished. No challenges to radical con-
structivism seem to explore this avenue. 
Initial assumptions are usually very hard,
if not impossible, to test. Even if one were to
come to understand another view and its ini-
tial assumptions, understanding the initial
assumptions generally reveals how well they
too fit experience.
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 In the end we come back
to the realization that to choose a set of initial
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assumptions from which to operate is either
an act of faith or an arbitrary decision.
 
The standards of logic
 
Each paradigm generally operates by the rules
of logical operations agreed upon by all across
paradigms.
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 The structures and conclusions
of each paradigm are merely the proper
results of these logical operations starting
from a particular set of initial assumptions.
For this reason the structures and conclusions
of one paradigm cannot be expected to be
consistent with another paradigm based on
different initial assumptions.
These things being the case, the structures
and conclusions from a paradigm can only be
judged faulty or incorrect, if it can be demon-
strated that there is an error in logic at some
point after the initial assumptions, that faulty
data have been used or that the conclusions
do not fit experience. A claim that a conclu-
sion from one paradigm is false because it
does not fit another paradigm is trivial and
 
non-sequitur
 
. Conclusions from within a par-
ticular paradigm are not intended to apply to
another paradigm and cannot logically be
required to apply to that other paradigm’s dif-
ferent set of initial assumptions. It is impor-
tant to note that since such conclusions are
intended to fit experience, another paradigm
with different initial assumptions may indeed
have an entirely different conclusion to fit the
same experience. Both sets of conclusions are
equally valid, each in their own paradigm.
Sadly, few, if any, of the arguments offered
in the many publications and gigabytes of on-
line discussion attempt to point out an error
in logic from the basic premise of radical con-
structivism or from faulty data. They all make
the strategic blunder of pointing out errors in
radical constructivism as if it must be com-
mensurate with realism. Hence, much effort
has been expended in this program to prove
radical constructivism wrong, but to no avail.
There are two problems with this strategy.
One, as has been pointed out, is the logical
error that conclusions must be universally
applicable instead of dependent on the initial
assumptions from which they are derived.
The other is that such lines of reasoning reveal
that their architects are not operating from
the initial assumptions of radical constructiv-
ism. Such arguments are not likely to impress
the thoughtful observer of such debates, let
alone change someone’s mind.
 
To challenge a view
 
 Observing then that thoughtful people work
diligently and carefully to reason appropri-
ately from initial assumptions and that the
initial assumptions too are subjected to
intense scrutiny to check how well they fit
experience, how can one judge a paradigm?
Beyond previous experience, the only way is
to test its usefulness. Do the predictions
made from it fit experience? Can it be used to
successfully accomplish desirable goals? As
von Glasersfeld (1999a, [3]) has put it:
“Ultimately, of course, a way of thinking
must not only be claimed feasible but, in
order to become attractive, its advantages
must be shown in action.”
We shall come back to some evidence of
the usefulness of radical constructivism later
in this piece.
 
Evidence of the logical 
error: An example
 
Consider an example illustrating the logical
errors made by realists attempting to prove
radical constructivism wrong, useless or
dangerous. The point in bringing up this
example and commentary is not to demon-
strate the superiority of one view over
another, but the logical errors typically made
in such arguments.
One can see the persistence of realist
assumptions in the following comment by
Owen (1999, [4]) in response to von Glasers-
feld’s paper (1999a).
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(Sentences have been
numbered in arabic numerals surrounded
by curled brackets to facilitate reference in
the following analysis.)
“{1}The Archimedian predicament above
is joined by the much-discussed paradox-
icality when radical constructivism tries
to observe itself and construct a theoreti-
cal similitude of itself that can be {i}
selected as the most ‘efficient’ among oth-
ers by means of a criterion of judgment
that is likewise selected in a non-arbitrary
manner, while {ii} avoiding the appear-
ance of violating its own Canon of the
subjectivity of efficiency or utility. {2}
How can a Doctrine of the Subjectivity of
‘Knowledge’ describe itself in generally
valid terms? {3 } After all, we cannot claim
that the Doctrine of radical constructriv-
ism is a prior principle or schematum for
the synthetic understanding of itself. {4}
I falter here, as Kant did: I am seeking to
make objectively valid statements about a
document that specifies such statements
are logically undecidible. {5} One is dis-
couraged from doing the heavy lifting
required here when no matter how intel-
lectually conscientious one is, the reduc-
tion to ‘a mere matter of personal opin-
ion’ cannot be logically defeated. {6} Or
the retort, ‘Well, if radical constructivism
works for you, that’s fine!’ {7} No matter
what radical constructivism officially
states, its originators were seeking episte-
mological ‘Truth’.”
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In the rather long sentence {1} two
attributes of radical constructivism deemed
incompatible are presented. Attribute {i}
refers to a desire for radical constructivism
to be “most “efficient” among others by
means of a criterion of judgment that is …
selected in a non-arbitrary manner.” Of
course, it would be “violating its own Canon
of the subjectivity of…utility,” (attribute
{ii}) if it were to attempt to demonstrate it is
the most superior by non-arbitrary criteria
of judgment. Stated this way there does
appear to be a paradox. But, in radical con-
structivism, one would neither claim to have
the most efficient explanation or theory nor
that there could be non-arbitrary criteria of
judgment. One might claim that an explana-
tion fits or enables one to be effective at
something, but having the most efficient
explanation is not required. We can never
prove there is not another “more efficient”
explanation out there. Nonetheless, to be
effective or even apparently more effective,
does no more than to suggest a degree of fit
with experience.
Sentences {2} & {3} explicitly reveal the
belief that the goal of radical constructivism
is validity. That Owen wrote to this effect is
evidence that his thinking about radical con-
structivism is subject to realist criteria. Cer-
tainly, if by validity one means truth, or
closer proximity to truth, then this is neither
the goal nor the claim of radical constructiv-
ism.
 The intent expressed in sentence {4} is to
make “objectively valid statements.” This is a
realist goal, not a radical constructivist goal.
In sentences {5} & {6} the dilemma presented
is the conflict between the desire to logically
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defeat something that does not yield to such
methods. Apparently, intellectual “heavy
lifting” is only rewarded by achieving the
goal of logically disproving something or at
least the possibility of logically disproving
something. Finally, in sentence {7} is the
claim that radical constructivist adherents
are really “seeking epistemological ‘Truth’,”
in spite of what is stated explicitly in the arti-
cle Owen is commenting upon. It seems
clear, at least from these words, that the real-
ist view is most consistent with the desired
methods and goals: that thinking and logic
can enable us to prove which of two positions
is closer to a veridical picture of reality.
Again, apparently, the point is to come to a
true picture of reality, which can be arrived
at through our mental efforts.
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We see similar evidence that truth is the
be all and end all in determining value in sci-
entific explanation among critics of radical
constructivism in the writing of Matthews
(1998, p. 5):
“There is a not-too-subtle difference
between the constructivist formulation
‘making sense,’ and the realist formula-
tion ‘finding out.’ The former has no epis-
temological or referential bite; the latter
has both. Things can make perfect sense
without being true; and making still more
sense does not imply any increase in truth
content.”
… and from Kragh (1998, p. 129):
“The epistemology characteristic of con-
structivists is either relativistic or agnostic,
in the sense that they do not admit any dis-
tinction between true and false accounts of
nature…, Denying the existence of an
objective nature, or declaring it without
interest, scientists’ accounts are all there is,
and it is with these accounts the construc-
tivist sociologist is solely concerned. How,
then, do scientists manage to produce
their results and build up a corpus of con-
sensual knowledge about what they call
nature?”
In these two passages there seems to be
the implicit expectation that the sense made
by mere students is extremely unlikely to
resemble what scientists decided before.
This suggests a belief about human nature,
e.g., that most people are not capable of
making the same sense of phenomena that
scientists have in the past. Apparently, in
this view, scientists are the few special peo-
ple who can make proper sense of the phe-
nomena.
Both authors do seem to be able to give
accurate descriptions of these facets of radi-
cal constructivism, but just as they are clear
in their descriptions, they clearly fail to rec-
ognize the logical error of expecting radical
constructivism to be consistent with the ini-
tial assumptions it has discarded: those of
realism.
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 This does not make radical con-
structivism right, but it renders the argu-
ments of these authors invalid. From the
radical constructivist position, attempting
to make such arguments is inappropriate.
Where did these non-radical constructiv-
ist notions come from? The most likely ori-
gin could be the realism so prevalent in west-
ern culture. This realism is pervasive in our
culture and there is little or no exposure to
an alternative experienced by most of soci-
ety. It goes unexamined by most members of
the culture. The realist origins of the oft-
described difficulties are even more plausi-
ble when one takes a critical look at many
such passages on difficulties with radical
constructivism. Owen clearly expresses dis-
belief in the words of the article on which he
is commenting. In paragraph 52 of von Gla-
sersfeld’s article (1999a) we find the follow-
ing:
“The value of the constructivist model –
and I emphasize once more that radical
constructivism makes no ontological
claims and is intended as no more, but
also no less, than a useful model of
knowledge and the activity of knowing –
will have to be determined by its applica-
tion to basic problems we run into in the
construction of our experiential worlds.”
It appears then that one major challenge,
possibly 
 
the
 
 major challenge, in understand-
ing radical constructivism is the pervasive,
implicit grounding we all have in realism
from our culture and our own nature. Until
one gets past this hurdle, one cannot be
described as understanding radical construc-
tivism. Throughout the discussions, argu-
ments and debates concerning radical con-
structivism, reference to Truth maintains its
presence as revealed by the words of very
intelligent, sincere detractors. This is evi-
dence of the difficulty of letting go of realist
criteria, which are not part of radical con-
structivism. Such criteria are unnecessary and
counter productive in radical constructivism.
 
A possible parallel with 
Buddhist thought
 
There are probably readers of these words
more conversant with Buddhism
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 than the
author, but it appears that there is a school of
thought in Buddhism that arrived at ideas
similar to those in radical constructivism,
albeit by a different path.
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 It has been
explained that these schools of thought are to
be considered a sequence one moves through
or can move through in thinking about the
nature of what we know and how we know
it.
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 The final school of thought is called the
Middle Way. An expression of the Middle Way
is the opening passage by Nagarjuna. The
Middle Way appears to have encountered and
continues to encounter challenges very simi-
lar to those faced by radical constructivism.
What light might this shed on the challenges
mounted against radical constructivism?
The central idea in the Middle Way when
first translated into English was referred to as
“emptiness.” This word is still used in the lit-
erature. What it refers to is the notion that
when we attempt to go beyond the conven-
tional existence of anything, we find no ulti-
mate essence. The consequence is that the
conventional existence of something has a
beginning, middle and end. For Buddhists
this is characteristic of the world we know.
This beginning, middle, and end, sometimes
put as arising, existing, ceasing, applies also
to what we think things are – all things:
objects, ideas, etc. Thus conventional exist-
ence is an expression of emptiness. Von Gla-
sersfeld (1999b, [6]) appears to have
intended something similar when he wrote:
“Considered as a proposed way of think-
ing and not as a description of the way
things are, the question to ask about the
constructivist model is simply: does it give
a viable account of the knowledge I rely on
in my actual living. I obviously believe it
does – but this in no way denies the possi-
bility that tomorrow or the next day a
more elegant or effective model might be
constructed.”
Without ultimate essence there is no ver-
idical picture of essential or ultimate reality.
Any current viable account of experience that
exists now, arose and we can expect it to be
discarded at some point in the future for
another viable account that we consider
more useful at that point.
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A text on the Middle Way was written by
the Buddhist scholar, Nagarjuna, in the sec-
ond century C. E. This text is still studied by
Buddhist scholars today. In it Nagarjuna
explains and defends the Middle Way in verse
form. The book from which the opening
translation was taken includes a very interest-
ing and useful commentary. What is consid-
ered to describe the Middle Way in a nutshell
is Chapter 24, verse 18 (Garfield 1995):
“Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation,
Is itself the middle way.”
It appears that what is meant here is that
the impermanence of everything we know
conventionally means that everything we
know conventionally lacks ultimate essence;
it is empty. Any essence we might perceive is
our own imputation, human construction.
In addition the designation “empty” is itself
empty; hence, emptiness is empty of ultimate
essence, also. This notion that emptiness
itself is empty seems to be very similar to a
claim repeated by radical constructivists
(Glasersfeld 1999a, [4]):
“I would be contradicting one of the basic
principles of my own theory if I were to
claim that the constructivist approach
provides a true description of an objective
state of affairs.”
Challenges to the Middle Way come from
essentialism in its various forms. Essentialism
entails the notion that the ultimate essence of
something exists and can be known. A conse-
quence of this ultimate essence of something
is permanence, hence it does not arise nor
does it cease and it can have no cause either to
arise or to cease. There are two extremes in
essentialism. In the case of the reification of
the phenomenal world then emptiness
(dependence) cannot exist, but ultimate
essence does. In the case of the reification of
emptiness, nihilism, the phenomenal world
cannot exist, hence the ultimate essence of the
phenomenal world is permanent non-exist-
ence. These two extremes in essentialism
seem to be realism and solipsism, respectively.
Either physical reality exists or it does not. If
it exists, then we can work on knowing it bet-
ter and better. The only other option in essen-
tialism is non-existence.
The nature of the responses Nagarjuna
makes to challenges to the Middle Way
become evident when one reads the commen-
tary. Repeatedly he shows how positions
involving either extreme of essentialism, lead
to contradiction. The only way to avoid these
contradictions is to avoid the extremes of
essentialism. Avoiding the contradictions
enables one to be consistent with the funda-
mental Buddhist tenets.
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 This middle path
then holds emptiness, as well as all of the phe-
nomenal world, as empty.
Every challenge to the Middle Way is effec-
tively countered by Nagarjuna in essentially
this same way. The many examples of Nagar-
juna’s counters to the challenges suggest that
the chief challenge to understanding the Mid-
dle Way has its origins in not being able to step
outside of essentialism, 
 
i.e.
 
, realism. Hence,
even in cultures considered to be majority
Buddhist, the notion of the Middle Way was
misunderstood, apparently in a way very sim-
ilar to the misunderstanding of radical con-
structivism.
This may help us to understand better our
own situation in which so many seem to mis-
understand radical constructivism. Even in a
setting in which a similar philosophical posi-
tion is officially sanctioned, there is resistance
of the same sort. Apparently the situation is
not simply a matter of our realist culture but
of something deeper in the human experience
and functioning.
 
15
What 
 
can
 
 we do?
 
Considering possible responses to the chal-
lenge of understanding radical constructiv-
ism, we need to keep in mind important fea-
tures of radical constructivism:
1. Meaning exists only in the mind, hence it
cannot be transmitted (Glasersfeld, in
press)
2. The only person who can make new
understanding for a person is that person.
3. In the case of communication, meaning
can be negotiated, but at best we can only
 
take
 
 this negotiated meaning 
 
as shared
 
.
4. Meaning or understanding is formulated
to fit experience, and so revised when
needed.
The consequence of these features of radi-
cal constructivism is that we should strive to
emulate von Glasersfeld (1999b, [1]) – as he
explained:
“I entered the fray neither to preach nor to
convince, but in the hope of being criti-
cized in a way that might push me to think
and above all to express my thoughts more
clearly.”
Certainly, given the number of recurrences
of application of realist criteria to radical con-
structivism and the number of responses to
these misapplications in different words and
different contexts, it appears that there is no
magic bullet, no set of words that can be used
to avoid initial misunderstanding of what is
intended by radical constructivism.
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 The
results of von Glasersfeld’s eloquence over
many years now support this contention. The
process of constructing a new understanding
is a process, not something that can be handed
out to anyone who will read or listen. Simi-
larly, the practitioners of the Buddhist
Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy
point out that a crucial feature is meditative
praxis that enables the experience of the emp-
tiness of all phenomena. This significance of
process in knowing, both on the part of radi-
cal constructivism and of the Buddhist Mid-
dle Way, is in stark contrast with the realism
that dominates Western philosophy and sci-
ence with the focus on final product.
 
Disequilibration as 
central to change in 
understanding
 
The problem of realists understanding radi-
cal constructivism is analogous to that in sci-
ence education (Dykstra 2005). Those teach-
ing science usually have significantly
different understandings of the phenomena
than their students. This has been known for
some time and is well documented (Duit
2006). Much effort has been expended by
many very diligent, sincere, intelligent
instructors, yet the outcome is most students
leave with the same understanding of the
phenomena they came with, new terms not-
withstanding. Meaning was not transmitted
to the students (Duit 2006). Of course, this
negative result has to be explained. The realist
adopts the elitist doctrine that only a few spe-
cial students can properly receive what has
been transmitted. radical constructivism
offers an alternative.
If meaning cannot be transmitted, then is
instruction for all a hopeless cause? It appears
that attempts to transmit meaning in science
 54 Constructivist Foundations
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instruction generally fail. To attempt to trans-
mit something entails something that can be
transmitted. In realism this meaning, often
called knowledge, is assumed to have this
property. That the attempt to transmit “sci-
ence knowledge” is such a spectacular failure
in science education suggests a substantial
failure of the realist program to fit experience.
An alternative exists to this dismal pros-
pect. The Swiss Genetic Epistemologist, Jean
Piaget, and his colleagues studied the think-
ing of children and students for more than 60
years. This work focused not on what happens
in school, but on what appears to be happen-
ing in the minds of young human beings.
Piaget and his co-workers developed an
explanatory model for the developmental
processes they observed in many students
(Piaget 1985). Human beings establish and
maintain equilibrium between their concep-
tions of their world and their experiences in
their world. When they perceive disequilibra-
tion, they move to re-establish equilibrium.
This can happen in either of two ways. The
offending experience can be ignored or
avoided, swept under the carpet, so to speak.
On the other hand, conceptions of the world
can be changed such that the offending expe-
rience no longer offends.
In this model, human beings are con-
stantly experiencing their world. There is a
constant, not always conscious, checking of
these experiences against expectations based
on existing explanatory schemes. As long as
experiences are consistent with existing
explanatory conceptions, these experiences
reinforce those conceptions. It should be
noted that a significant part of this process is
the selective ignoring of certain differences
that in the applicable conception are deemed
unimportant. This processing of experience
that matches or fits existing explanatory con-
ceptions is called by Piaget “assimilation.”
Under these conditions, existing explanations
account for experience, hence there is neither
need nor motivation to revise or devise new
explanatory conceptions. There is equilib-
rium between experience and existing expla-
nation.
When experience is encountered that is
perceived not to fit existing explanation and
this mismatch cannot be ignored, a state of
disequilibration between explanation and
experience is experienced. Once avoidance is
not an option, then a process of self-regula-
tion is initiated and existing explanation is
modified and tested until the new or modified
explanation fits these new experiences. An
accommodation is developed. The disequili-
bration can be minor or monumental. Either
way the new explanation fits experience better
than the previously existing explanatory con-
ceptions.
If one wishes to engage someone in devel-
oping new understanding, disequilibration is
key. This is central for any teacher who wishes
students to leave the instructional setting with
new understanding. The teacher needs to
understand the students’ thinking about a
phenomenon. With this understanding in
mind, the teacher needs to search for exam-
ples of experience with the phenomenon that
do not fit the students’ thinking. Having
picked an example, to maximize the chances
that students disequilibrate, the teacher will
engage the students in making and explaining
predictions about the example. This engages
commitment to the explanation by the stu-
dents and makes explicit features of their
explanatory conceptions. The prediction sets
up a test of their explanations. If the teacher
has developed a sufficient understanding of
the students’ understandings, then when they
experience the example experience, they will
not be able to assimilate it. Disequilibration is
the result. If the teacher has not developed a
sufficient understanding of the students’
understandings, then they will be able to
assimilate the new experience. Disequilibra-
tion does not occur and no change in existing
explanations will be necessary. Even though
the students do not change their understand-
ings, the event provides evidence for the
teacher to develop a better understanding of
the students’ understandings.
If, in the classroom, it is safe for their pre-
dictions to be found not fitting their explana-
tions, then it is safe to speculate about and test
alternative explanations, on the evidence of
the new experience. These alternative expla-
nations can be tested. This process of elicita-
tion of explanatory conceptions, comparing
these conceptions with experience, and
resolving discrepancies can be cycled over
additional experiences that do not fit explana-
tion at each cycle. The result is always explan-
atory conceptions that fit more experience
and usually fit more closely.
Dykstra (2005) shares data in evidence
that change in understanding the phenomena
can be the result of this approach to instruc-
tion. On established diagnostics of students’
conceptions, course averages for non-science
majors routinely change by four or five times
the amount the class averages change for sci-
ence and engineering majors that experience
conventional instruction on the same topics.
The large change in understanding is not just
achieved by a few special students, but essen-
tially by all who are willing to participate in
the process.
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 The instruction described is
pursued with the goal of engaging students in
examining and testing their own sense of the
phenomena. This is in contrast to typical
instruction in which the activity has the
exclusive goal of transmitting the knowledge
to the students by telling and showing them.
The structure of the canonical knowledge
does not drive this instruction. Instead, the
students’ understanding and the experiences
it can be applied to drive the instruction. It is
not a focus on the phenomena, nor is it an
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attempt to guess what scientists figured out in
the past. It is a focus by the students on their
own understanding and testing it carefully
against experience with the phenomena. In
other words, it is the process that makes the
changes in understanding possible.
 
Disequilibration:
Key to breaking the 
bonds of realism
 
If this approach to education can shed any
light on engaging people in constructing an
understanding of radical constructivism, it
seems to be in inducing disequilibration. One
cannot disequilibrate someone else, but one
can create settings in which people are more
likely to disequilibrate themselves. The effort
to accomplish this induction of disequilibra-
tion must be understood as a process. We do
not have the luxury of having an impartial
third entity, such as some physical phenome-
non to check against. Consequently, all we
have to share is our words and the gestures we
make. The only experience another has to
work with to test their explanation of what we
are talking about is experience with our words
and gestures. Just as experience with a physi-
cal phenomenon neither conveys nor proves
the truth of an explanation, our words and
gestures do not convey or prove meaning to
someone else. In the case of radical construc-
tivism the process is more complicated and
requires more time than the phenomena of
introductory physics.
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It is necessary in our interactions with
realists that we recognize they do not realize
we are working with a profoundly different set
of initial assumptions. Society is set up by
realists to be compatible with their view. They
will work very hard at interpreting what we
say in their terms. They cannot “hear” what
we are saying in our own terms, because they
have yet to construct the requisite ideas.
Before they begin to develop another way of
thinking, they have to disequilibrate. We have
to calculate to say and do things, to bring their
attention to things that do not fit their realist
explanations of their world, i.e., things that do
not make sense to them. We run the risk of
their concluding we are deluded or misled.
This is the equivalent of sweeping the experi-
ence, and us, under the carpet. On the other
hand, there will be some who draw near to the
discrepancy they perceive and begin to
develop new conceptions in interactions with
us. We cannot afford to let the risk of being
written off deter us from our efforts to induce
disequilibration. Without disequilibration,
no change in understanding happens.
It should be clear that this process requires
patience. We see this in Ernst von Glasersfeld’s
approach. For many his calm and patient
demeanor, coupled with his willingness to
interact, have provided necessary ingredients
to enable us to construct our understandings
of radical constructivism. We can only hope
to emulate him in our own efforts to help oth-
ers understand.
Thank you Ernst for engaging with us in
constructing our own new understandings,
for being our mentor.
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Notes
 
1. For the reader who is not familiar with
radical constructivism there are two
sources that serve as good starting points
for making sense of radical constructiv-
ism. The shorter of these two is the article
 
Knowing without metaphysics
 
 (Glasersfeld
1999a). The article is accessible on-line. A
more extensive description is in the book
 
Radical constructivism: A way of knowing
and learning
 
 (Glasersfeld 1995).
2. A few examples: Bickhard (1995); Phillips
(2000); Suchting (1992).
3. For example: Matthews (2000); Kragh
(1998); Nola (1998).
4. Since the objects of interest here are para-
digms concerning the explanation of ex-
perience, any paradigm whose initial
assumptions do not fit experience will
have a hard time surviving the need for fit
to experience. “Being explained” entails fit
between explanation and that which is to
be explained. Since the attempt is to ex-
plain experience, it is not an assumption
that initial assumptions in a paradigm
must fit experience. It is a consequence of
the belief that experience can be explained.
Fitting experience is the point of the pro-
cess. An explanation that does not fit
would neither be viable nor an explana-
tion. This is not uniquely Piagetian. It is
fundamental to the process of any attempt
to explain a specified set of experiences
from any paradigm. It is certainly the basis
of science.
5. It is important to keep in mind the differ-
ence between understanding a view and
accepting that view.
6. By “logic” and “logical operations” I mean
to distinguish initial assumptions, de-
scriptions of experience and conclusions
from the logical operations used to derive
conclusions from the assumptions and de-
scriptions of experience. The logical oper-
ations are in the “if…, then…” and the
“because…” parts of explanation.
7. This passage is reproduced exactly as it ap-
pears on-line. The only thing changed is
the font and font size.
8. It should be noted that in the case of this
particular author, reading the note in its
entirety reveals the author is working on
making sense of radical constructivism.
This is relatively rare. Most negative pub-
lications about radical constructivism are
attempts to disprove it, not understand it.
9. Alan Wallace (2006, personal communi-
cation) suggests: “The fundamental ques-
tion as I see it is: are you seeking to
understand reality as it exists indepen-
dently of perceptual experience and
thought? Or are you seeking to understand
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the world of experience (Lebenswelt),
which does not exist independently of per-
cepts and concepts? Philosophical realists
are concerned with the former, whereas
Buddhists (especially Madhyamikas
[Middle Way adherents]) are concerned
with the latter.” In radical constructivism
the position is that our experiential reality
is all we can access. We have no way to ac-
cess something that might be independent
of perceptual experience and thought.
This suggests a certain similarity between
the positions of Buddhism and radical
constructivism in contrast to realism.
10.One should note that Riegler (2001) shows
how one can understand science from a
radical constructivist point of view. Of
course, the drive to find truth is not part of
this way of understanding science.
11.Others associated with radical construc-
tivism have explored connections between
Buddhist thought and radical constructiv-
ism. The interested reader should consult
Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991). In the
present piece the point is not primarily the
similarities between the two philosophies,
but that both have faced analogous on-
slaughts from defenders of realism.
12.It is the case that Buddhism practices sim-
ilar ideals to those of radical constructiv-
ism. In particular both are based on the
extent to which they fit experience. This is
one of many differences in Buddhism
from religions we in the west are generally
familiar with. The consequence is that
Buddhist philosophy evolves as does our
understanding in radical constructivism.
13.This explanation of the relationship be-
tween these philosophical schools was giv-
en in verbal interaction by Geshe Lhakdor,
Director of the Library of Tibetan Works
and Archives, Dharamsalla, India, Decem-
ber, 2005.
14. The Four Noble Truths in Buddhism and
their implications serve as the foundation
on which Buddhism and its philosophy
are built. They are: (1) All life in cyclic ex-
istence is suffering. (2) There is a cause of
this suffering, namely, craving caused by
ignorance. (3) There is a release from suf-
fering. (4) The path to that release is the
eightfold Buddhist path of Right View,
Right Understanding, Right Speech, Right
Action, Right Livelihood, Right Effort,
Right Mindfulness and Right Concentra-
tion (Garfield 1995, p. 294). The order in
this list of the eightfold path has been ad-
justed to conform to the standard in Tibet-
an Buddhism.
15.One wonders with access to cinema pre-
mises, such as that in 
 
The Matrix
 
, and ac-
cess to virtual reality, if there is the slow
evolution of culture beyond realism. Sad-
ly, many young people seem more inter-
ested in material gain. In this context it
appears 
 
The Matrix
 
 is still science fiction,
with the emphasis on fiction.
16.The typical conclusion first jumped to
about radical constructivism while still
rooted in realist foundations is that radical
constructivism is nothing more than the
absurd assertion of solipsism.
17.The elitist notion implied in the realist
criticism by their assumption that mere
students making sense about phenomena
cannot lead to what scientists have decided
is without merit in the light of this data.
18.The shift from the goal of students “get-
ting” the distilled wisdom transmitted to
engaging students in making sense of their
experiences seems similar to Piet Hut’s
(2003) reference to “goal-as-path” forms
of Buddhism in contrast to what might be
goal-as-result forms.
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